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1 The present contribution is a completed and adapted version of an article that has previously appeared in
“Aspects juridiques du paiement électronique”, collective work, T.2, (Kluwer, 2004), p.123.
2 The present article only reflects the personal views of its authors. The authors wish to thank V. Musin, P. Collette 
and B. Lempkowicz for their contributions.
3 See www.registrenational.fgov.be.
4 Obliging each municipality for the first time to keep “a register of inhabitants with their names, forenames, place 
of birth, last domicile, occupation, trade and other means of subsistence” in order to facilitate the ten-yearly census.
Those registers, however, fell into disuse under the Dutch occupation. The Act of 2 June 1856 concerning the
general census and the population registers once again linked with the ten-yearly census the obligation to keep
municipal population registers in order to allow the calculation of the annual population figure and the
establishment of certain figures between two censuses (cf.
http://rijksregister.fgov.be/bev_fr/voorstelling/bev_f_voorstelling_d.htm).
5 See Royal Decree of 6 February 1919, adopted on the basis of the aforesaid Act of 2 June 1856 (footnote above).
6 Article 6 of the Act of 19 July 1991 concerning the population registers and identity cards, amending the Act of 8
August 1983 organizing a national Register of natural persons, Moniteur Belge of 3 September 1991, p. 19075.
7 For an analysis of the traditional identity card, see WARRANT, F., “La réglementation belge en matière de carte
d’identité”, Dr. inform. 1987, p. 115.
8 Act of 25 March 2003 amending the Act of 8 August 1983 organizing a national Register of natural persons and
the Act of 19 July 1991 concerning the population registers and identity cards, amending the Act of 8 August
1983 organizing a national Register of natural persons, Moniteur Belge, 28 March 2003, p. 15921. 
9 See http://www.belgium.be/eportal/index.jsp and Wall-on-line, “Le projet wallon d’E-Gouvernement”, p.5 ,
which also gives the following definition: “E-government is the gradual transformation of the internal and external
relations of the public sector through the information and communication technologies”.
10 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 23.
11 Such services include application for a license plate, reporting accidents at work, VAT returns, granting access to
a waste sorting park, library or swimming pool, etc. 
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A r t i c l e
Introduction2
Traditionally, the identity card is
regarded as a document “certifying
registration in the population
register”,3 proving certain aspects of
the civil status of its bearer. While
the population register was
instituted in Belgium by the French
occupying authority in 1792,4 it was
not until the end of the First World
War that the well-known obligation
was imposed on the municipal
authorities to issue an identity card
to every person aged 15.5 The
identity card is currently issued by
the population section of the
municipal authority to Belgians and
foreigners who are admitted or
authorized to settle in Belgium.6
From then on, like in most countries
in the world, this document has
been issued in paper format.7
This practice, which is soon to become a
century old, was however, to witness a small
revolution with the introduction in Belgian law of
the electronic identity card by the Act of 25 March
2003.8 By doing so, the Belgian legislator has
added a stone to the construction of what is
sometimes already called e-government, which is
defined as the “basically new, integrated and
continuous way of providing services by making
maximum use of the possibilities of the new
information and communication technologies”.9
This Belgian initiative is in line with a wider
European trend, aimed at the development of
information technology infrastructures allowing
the use of information and communication
technology for easier, more accessible and more
transparent communication between citizens and
government.10
This trend is aimed, first of all, at making life
easier for the citizens by giving them a “tool”
enabling them to gain access in an easy and user-
friendly manner to most public services,11 through
the use of new technologies and more particularly
the internet. In doing so, it is hoped that long
queues and inconvenient opening hours will
become a thing of the past by making it possible
to perform the necessary formalities through the
use of the new electronic identity card from a
personal computer, at any time of day or night. In
this connection, we should also draw attention to
the initiatives aimed at standardizing the procedure
so that data concerning a particular citizen only
needs to be entered once and subsequently made
accessible to all public officials who need to
consult them, without the citizen each time having
to repeat the procedure.12
The additional benefit that the new electronic
identity card is expected to offer is also sought to
make government administration run more
smoothly. The card should be able to speed up the
process of transmitting administrative documents
and avoid the accumulation of an excessive
backlog. It is for these reasons that many
European countries have begun creating and using
electronic identity cards. Italy,13 Finland,14 and
Sweden15 have already reached the stage of large-
scale use. France16 and Spain are going to launch
their national electronic identity card in the coming
years so that a mass rollout of the former identity
cards could be achieved for 2008.
In Belgium, a step towards electronic
administration has already been taken in industry
with initiatives such as DIMONA17 and on-line VAT
returns.18 A further step was taken in April 2003
when the electronic identity card was issued to
citizens in eleven pilot municipalities.19 The card
was also issued to certain specific target groups
such as certain public officials and liberal
professions so that they should set an example in
terms of the social benefits of the new electronic
identity card.20 The actual decision to proceed
with the general introduction of the electronic
identity card was taken by Royal Decree in 2004,21
in accordance with the provisions of the law,22
with a view to achieving the entire replacement of
all existing identity cards with electronic identity
cards by the end of 2009.23
The present study will examine in more detail
certain legal questions connected with the
introduction of the electronic identity card.
We will first consider the new legal functions
that are presented by the electronic identity card,
namely “authentication” and “electronic
signature”. We will also address the question of
the modalities for reporting loss or theft of the
card as well as the implications, notably in terms of
the responsibilities linked to any fraudulent use
that may result. The issue of the information
contained on the card, and more particularly
information that is not legible to the naked eye,
such as the address, will also be discussed, notably
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12 The FEDMAN network (Federal Metropolitan Area Network) has thus been set up in order to link up all
government bodies electronically. This initiative is also aimed at reducing the number of forms used and
consequently at substantially cutting costs. For more information about FEDMAN, see
http://www.belgium.be/eportal/index.jsp.
13 For more information, see: http://www.itworld.com/Man/2681/itwnews010319italy/;
http://dgrc.org/dgo2004/disc/posters/tuesposters/rp_arcieri.pdf;
http://www.infosec.co.uk/ExhibitorLibrary/168/ItalianID_CaseStudy.pdf.
14 For more information, see: http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/2649/334;
http://www.tml.hut.fi/Opinnot/Tik-110.501/1999/papers/fineidcase/case.html.
15 For more information, see: http://interop-
esa05.unige.ch/INTEROP/Proceedings/eGovScientific/papers/42.pdf.
16 For more information, see: http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/04/12/HNfrenchbiometriccards_1.html;
http://www.electronic-identity.org/porvoo/2/france.ppt.
17 DIMONA (Déclaration IMmédiate – Immediate Declaration) is an electronic social security declaration system,
which is compulsory for all employers in the private sector. Every commencement or termination of employment
must be communicated immediately to the Department of Social Security (ONSS), Circular N°522, 6 June 2002,
Moniteur Belge 26 July 2002, p. 33314.
18 See http://www.belgium.be/taxonweb/app/citizen/public/taxbox/home: facility introduced by the Royal
Decree of 27 March 2003 establishing an electronic declaration system, Moniteur Belge, 4 April 2003, p. 17197.
19 Borsbeek, Geraardsbergen, Jabbeke, Lasne, Louvain, Marche-en-Famenne, Rochefort, Seneffe, Seraing, Tongres,
Woluwé-Saint-Pierre (Article 1 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 establishing transitional measures in
connection with the electronic identity card, Moniteur Belge, 28 March 2003, p.15942), i.e. around 330,000
inhabitants. 65,000 electronic identity cards had to be issued per year during the trial period.
20 For more details we refer to the Royal Decree of 30 November 2003 amending the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003
establishing transitional measures in connection with the electronic identity card, Moniteur Belge, 12 December
2003, p. 58956.
21 Royal Decree of 1 September 2004 concerning the decision to proceed with the general introduction of the
electronic identity card, Moniteur Belge, 15 September 2004, p. 67527. This Royal Decree is accompanied by a
Royal Decree amending the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 establishing transitional measures in connection with
the electronic identity card, Moniteur Belge, 15 September 2004, p. 67528.
22 Article 19§1 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
23 At the information meeting of FEBELFIN on 10 March 2004, the date announced for the general introduction was
2007 (WYNANT, P., “De elektronische identiteitskaart in de financiële praktijk. Inleiding”). Meanwhile, the
Council of Ministers had decided in May 2004 to delay the general introduction of the electronic identity card by
two years until the end of 2009. This decision was based on an evaluation report of the House of Representatives
on the introduction of the electronic identity card (Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session
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in terms of its compatibility with other laws and
regulations imposing the legibility of this address.
Other questions connected with security will also
be dealt with. Finally, this analysis concludes with a
description of the procedure for issuing the card as
well as a brief enumeration of the applications
currently available and the outlook for the future.
The new legal functions
presented by the card:
authentication and electronic
signature 
n The identification function
Unlike the present identity card, whose sole
purpose is to identify its bearer, the new electronic
identity card also presents two additional
functions: in addition to the identification, in its
strict meaning, of its bearer (by reading the data
on the card that are legible to the naked eye), the
new card contains authentication and electronic
signature functions that enable the bearer to
legally commit himself towards the public
authorities or in the context of business relations.
The conventional identification function of the
identity card is that where the data identifying the
bearer are read from the card on which they are
printed in such a manner that they are visible to
the naked eye (name, forename, photograph, etc).
Generally speaking, any identification function
can take place in a passive manner from the point
of view of the person concerned, that is to say,
without his consent, and even without his
knowledge (consider for example the mechanism
for controlling access to certain buildings where
entry is authorized simply by camera control
allowing the guard to check the identity of
visitors).24
As is already the case with the conventional
identity card, the identification function of the new
electronic identity card does not involve any special
handling operation if it merely concerns the
physical presentation of the card for the purpose
of verifying the identity of its bearer.
We should remember in this connection that
the cases in which a bearer can be obliged to
show his identity card are restrictively enumerated
by law.25 Thus it is specified that the card must be
shown whenever the police so requests, as well as
with any notification, request for certificates and in
general for the purpose of establishing the identity
of the bearer. It must also be shown to a bailiff
serving a writ. If the electronic identity card is to
fully play its part as standardization tool, we may
ask ourselves whether it would not be a good idea
to revise these regulations in order to enlarge the
scope of cases where identification is required,
taking into account the new possibilities opened
up by the electronic identity card.
Moreover, still on the subject of identification, it
should be pointed out that Article 6§4 of the Act
concerning the electronic identity card imposes a
prohibition on automatically verifying the identity
of a citizen by means of the electronic identity card
without his consent. This provision stipulates that
the electronic identity card cannot be used without
special authorization as an authorization badge to
enter a building. The law also specifies that any
automated verification of the card by means of
optical or other reading processes must be ratified
by Royal Decree. This provision, however, only
applies to automated verification, namely
verification without human intervention, and does
not seek in any way to limit the contractual
freedom of two opposite parties. It therefore
seems permitted to provide in a contract that the
electronic identity card may be used for verification
purposes insofar as the citizen has given his
consent beforehand.
Nevertheless, this physical presentation of the
card does not in itself prove the true identity of the
bearer; it simply furnishes certain elements of
proof in this respect. Indeed, apart from the
photograph which currently constitutes the
principal identifying element, how can one be
certain that the written data actually relate to the
bearer of the card and that they have not been
falsified, for instance?
Moreover, this identification function alone does
not in itself offer an adequate solution to allow
remote communication with government
authorities, for example over the internet. These
are probably some of the reasons why the
legislator considered it expedient to incorporate
the electronic authentication function in the
identity card. The conventional identification by
physical presentation of the card by the bearer, for
reasons of inadequate security, is thus meant to
play a less important role in the future and only to
apply to legal acts with a lower level of
importance.
n The electronic authentication
function
The electronic authentication function is
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24 SYX, D., “Vers de nouvelles formes de signature? Le problème de la signature dans les rapports juridiques
électroniques”, Droit de l’informatique, 1986, p. 134.
25 Article 1, Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, Moniteur Belge, 28 March 2003, p. 15935.
24 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW www.deaeslr.org
From a purely
technical point of











intended to enable the bearer of the identity card
to prove with “certainty” that he is indeed the
person he claims to be. This is the “active” process
where the bearer identifies himself electronically
and voluntarily.26
This function calls for a specific handling
operation. The bearer of the electronic identity
card has to insert it into an appropriate reader
(terminal) and enter a secret code (PIN code),
which he alone is deemed to know (similarly to the
way in which bank debit cards are used today). If
this secret code is correct, the terminal sends a
message to the recipient (for example government
services) authenticating the bearer’s identity. From
a purely technical point of view, the entry of the
PIN code actually unlocks a private electronic key
contained in the microchip of the electronic
identity card, which in turn generates a
cryptogram (i.e. a message composed by means of
a coded system).
This cryptogram is created in a “dynamic” way
by the card each time the PIN code is entered. It
will therefore be randomly different each time the
card is used, and thus constitutes an additional
security measure.27 This technique is one of the
many security elements of the electronic identity
card that are designed to prevent the card from
being counterfeited all too easily.
This new function is meant to offer several
advantages. The use of this electronic
authentication may be considered in the future for
the purposes of secure connection to any internet
site. The use of the authentication certificate will
thus suffice to prove one’s identity in order to
obtain access to a particular website. To this end,
the creation of a standardized access platform may
be contemplated, which could introduce a certain
degree of standardization in the current diversity
existing in this area.
n The electronic signature function 
The electronic signature function will also be
contained in the new card. This will allow the
bearer to electronically sign a message and thus
mark his approval of its contents. Similarly, the
card may of course be used to sign e-mail
messages or mark one’s approval of certain
documents, either over the internet or at the
counter of a bank, hotel or car rental firm. But
what is the legal value of the electronic signature
of an electronic identity card?
n Principles applicable in this area
The Acts of 20 October 200028 and 9 July
200129 are concerned with introducing and
defining the concepts of electronic signature.30
Furthermore, they regulate the probative and legal
value of certain types of electronic signature. In
principle, those acts only apply in the case of
“open” networks, where the parties to this
network are not linked to each other beforehand
by private law contracts (generally on paper) that
legally regulate beforehand between the parties
the implications of operating in that network
(notably the question of the probative value
between the parties of the use of the PIN code or
the electronic signature).31
Given that the internet – the open network par
excellence – is to be the means of communication
in the area of e-government, the Acts of 20
October 2000 and 9 July 2001 should in principle
apply to the relations between citizens and
government services and, in particular, to the
electronic signature generated by the electronic
identity card. It is worth noting that the Act of 9
July 2001 on electronic signatures makes a
distinction between ‘simple’ electronic signature
and ‘advanced’ electronic signature. 
26 SYX, D., “Vers de nouvelles formes de signature? Le problème de la signature dans les rapports juridiques
électroniques”, o.c., p. 134.
27 This mechanism therefore differs from cards with a “static” authentication mechanism, where the cryptogram is
loaded once and for all on the card when it is created (called personalization) and remains unchanged thereafter.
28 Act of 20 October 2000 introducing the use of telecommunication media and electronic signature in judicial and
extrajudicial procedure, Moniteur Belge, 22 December 2000, p. 42698.
29 Act of 9 July 2001 establishing certain rules governing the legal framework for electronic signatures and
certification services, Moniteur Belge, p.33070.
30 For a more thoroughgoing analysis of those texts, we refer to STORME, M., “De invoering van de elektronische
handtekening in ons bewijsrecht-een inkadering van en commentaar bij de nieuwe wetsbepalingen”, R.W.,2000-
2001, p.1505; DE CLIPPELE, F., “Wettelijke regeling voor de elektronische handel”, R.D.C. ,2001, p.329; GOBERT,
D. and MONTERO, E.., “La signature dans les contrats et les paiements électroniques: l’approche fonctionnelle”,
D.A.O.R., 2000, p.17; GOBERT, D. and MONTERO, E., “L’ouverture de la preuve littérale aux écrits sous forme
électronique”, J.T. , 2001, p.113; ROGER FRANCE, E. and DE GROOTE, E., “La valeur probante des signatures
électroniques –Réseaux fermés, réseaux ouverts et opérations effectuées au moyen d’instruments de transfert
électronique de fonds”, R.D.C. 2002, p. 185; VAN EECKE, P., “Bewijsrecht en digitale handtekeningen: nieuwe
perspectieven”, in le droit des affaires en évolution. Le commerce électronique, A.B.J.E., n°10, Bruylant-Kluwer,
1999, p.233.
31 A typical example of a closed network is that constituted by the environment in which bank cards are used,
where the secret banking code is contractually equated with a handwritten signature. 
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A ‘simple’ electronic signature is defined as “a
data element in electronic form which is logically
joined or linked to other electronic data and which
serves as authentication method”.32 This may, for
example, be a PIN code.
An ‘advanced’ electronic signature is defined as
a ‘simple’ electronic signature which in addition
satisfies other supplementary requirements,
namely:
n the ability to identify the signatory 
(identification);
n the fact of being linked exclusively to the 
signatory (authentication);
n being created by means which the signatory 
can keep under his exclusive control 
(security);
n being linked to data to which it is connected 
in such a way that any subsequent changes 
in the data are detectable (integrity).33
The Act of 9 July 2001 establishes the “principle
of assimilation”34 assigning to (1) an ‘advanced’
electronic signature the same probative value as a
handwritten signature, on condition that this
signature was (2) produced on the basis of a
“qualified certificate”35 and that it was (3) created
“by means of a secure device for creating
electronic signatures”.36 This type of electronic
signature is sometimes called “qualified electronic
signature”37 or “strong signature”.
The term advanced electronic signature testifies
to the choice of the Belgian legislator in favour of
technological neutrality. At present, technically
speaking, only the digital signature using
asymmetric cryptography, such as the RSA38 type
signature, answers this definition. If, in addition,
this electronic signature technology is based on a
PKI39 type infrastructure of electronic certificates,
the end result, termed secure signature, will ensure
that the electronic signature thus created satisfies
the conditions for being equated with a
handwritten signature.
With the RSA technique, a secure signature is
created through a correlation between a pair of
asymmetric electronic keys, constituted by a
private40 key on the one hand and a public41 key
on the other. Unlike with symmetric cryptography
mechanisms, there is no shared secret between
the two parties since the private key remains
incorporated in the card held by the bearer and
the public key is freely accessible. The PKI
technology is the infrastructure surrounding the
RSA technique which, through the use of
certificates42 issued by certification service
providers (CSP), offers certainty that the signature
can be considered trustworthy by ensuring proper
agreement between the public key and the
identity of the holder. This link will be confirmed
by the various data contained in the certificate and
which ensure that this certificate can be called a
qualified certificate.43 As we will see, this
certificate always has a limited period of validity
and may even be revoked in certain cases.44
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32 Act of 9 July 2001, Article 2, o.c.
33 Act of 9 July 2001, Article 2, o.c. 
34 Article 4§4 of the Act of 9 July 2001.
35 A qualified certificate is a certificate bearing certain references listed in Annex 1 to the Act of 9 July 2001 and
issued by a certification service provider satisfying the conditions established in Annex 2.
36 The requirements imposed on those secure electronic signature creation devices are listed in Annex 3 to the Act
of 9 July 2001. It should also be noted that, besides the principle of assimilation, Belgian law has also established
the principle of non-discrimination against electronic signatures that do not satisfy the three conditions laid
down by the principle of assimilation. It is expressly provided that, besides the conventional handwritten
signature directly affixed to a document, an electronic alternative is now admissible in court. In practice this
means that a ‘simple’ electronic signature can no longer be refused as evidence in court on the sole ground that
it is in electronic form or that it is not based on a qualified certificate issued by an accredited certification service
provider (Article 4§5 of the Act of 9 July 2001).
37 JACOBS, E. “Authenticatie en elektronische handtekening in elektronisch bankieren”, in Juridische aspecten van de
elektronische betaling T.1., Kluwer 2004, p. 179.
38 Named after the founders Rivet, Shamir and Adleman.
39 Public Key Infrastructure.
40 This can be defined as a mathematical key, which is kept secret by its holder, and is used to create an electronic
signature and, depending on the algorithm, to decrypt messages or files encrypted with the corresponding
public key (http://www.signatureelectronique.be/glossary.cfm). See also the reading list in MASON, S.,
Electronic Signatures in Law, pp 101 –102.
41 This can be defined as a mathematical key that can be made publicly available and which is used to verify
signatures created with its corresponding private key. Depending on the algorithm, public keys are also used to
encrypt messages or files, which can then be decrypted with the corresponding private key.
42 I.e. “an electronic certificate that links the data connected with signature verification to a natural or legal person
and corroborates the identity of that person”, see Article 2, 3° of the Act of 9 July 2001, o.c.
43 Those data are: specification that the certificate has been issued as a qualified certificate; identification of the CSP as
well as the country where it is established; the name of the signatory or a pseudonym which is identified as such;
the possibility to include, where appropriate, the specific capacity of the signatory for which purposes the
certificate is intended; data connected with signature verification which correspond to the data for signature
creation under the control of the signatory; starting date and expiry date of the certificate; identity code of the
certificate; the advanced electronic signature of the CSP issuing the certificate; restrictions on the use of the
certificate and, where appropriate, the maximum value of the transactions for which the certificate may be used.
44 Articles 12 and 13 of the Act of 9 July 2001, o.c.: if the holder requests it in a discretionary manner, if the identification
of the holder has changed, when the accredited CSP so requires and, finally, for obvious security reasons.
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In its concern to achieve the highest level of
security, the law requires that the CSPs be
accredited within the meaning of the Act of 9 July
2001. This accreditation is subject to a double
basic obligation. First of all, the CSP must comply
with certain qualitative obligations45 and must
issue qualified certificates.46 Secondly, the CSP
must use secure signature creation devices.47 
The CSP may be obliged to suspend or revoke a
certificate. It must notify all users thereof by means
of a revocation list, called Certificate Revocation
List (CRL). This list will be published periodically on
the website of the CSP,48 containing the electronic
signature of a CSP and the references of the
certificates that are marked as suspended or
revoked before their expiry date. The list will
generally mention the name of the issuer, the date
of issue, the next issue date, and the serial number
of the certificates that have been suspended or
revoked, along with the exact moment and reason
for the suspension or revocation. The list of
suspended or revoked certificates will be accessible
on-line so as to enable the government to keep its
database up to date, even if it seems that keeping
a database accessible and up-to-date is not so
evident.49
n Application to electronic identity cards 
The government has naturally opted for the use
of RSA technology and the PKI infrastructure to
supply the new electronic identity cards with the
electronic signature function, thus allowing their
bearers to benefit from the principles of
assimilation50 and non-repudiation. Consequently,
a person who electronically signs a document
using his identity card should be entitled to the
same protection as that offered to handwritten
signatures.
To sign a message using an electronic identity
card, it will nevertheless be necessary to have a PIN
code and to have a card on which the electronic
keys have been activated, with the private key
remaining secret on the electronic identity card
and the public key being known to everyone by
means of a publication list.51
In practice, the signature function of the
electronic identity card can be divided into two
stages, the signature stage and the verification
stage. The signature stage unfolds as follows: the
bearer inserts his card into a terminal52 and enters
his secret code. The content of the message to be
signed is transformed53 into a sequence of
symbols, for example WXYZ. The private key,
which from the start is contained on the card
(insofar as such a request has been made to the
accredited certification service provider), then
comes into action and encrypts the symbols WXYZ
to create a signature cryptogram. The signature
stage, which unfolds entirely on the card, is then
completed and verification of the signature
cryptogram begins. This stage unfolds entirely
inside the terminal. The message that has been
signed with the private key is read by means of the
public key. This public key, which the terminal will
have to obtain from the accredited certification
service provider, interacts with the signature
cryptogram and transforms it into a sequence of
symbols. The terminal then verifies whether the
symbols thus obtained are identical to those
reproduced by the terminal itself, namely WXYZ. If
the answer to this question is affirmative, the
signature will be considered verified and valid.54
This signature function can be graphically
represented as follows:
45 Namely the conditions of Annex II to the Act of 9 July 2001.
46 The various conditions necessary to be able to speak of qualified certificates are specified in Annex I to the Act of
9 July 2001.
47 Namely those of Annex III to the Act of 9 July 2001.
48 By way of example, we refer the reader to http://status.eid.belgium.be/crl/.
49 For further comments on this subject, see MASON, S., Electronic Signatures in Law (LexisNexis Butterworths,
2003) paragraphs 5.32 – 5.33; 8.24 – 8.29.
50 The Internet Rights Observatory advocates a sparing use of the “advanced” electronic signature in order to
prevent it from becoming commonplace. It is indeed pointless to require an ‘advanced’ electronic signature in all
cases where assigning a user name together with a password or using a PIN code would suffice. We believe that
the ‘advanced’ electronic signature should be reserved for acts of high legal importance (for example to identify
a holder wishing to use his on-line banking application). On the other hand, the PIN code of a bank card, which
can be characterized only as a ‘simple’ electronic signature, retains its entire raison d’être for a series of legal acts
of a lesser legal importance, such as cash withdrawals from cash dispensers (ATMs) (see Internet Rights
Observatory, Success factors of e-government, Opinion no. 2 of the Internet Rights Observatory, p.11, available at
http://www.internet-observatory.be/internet_observatory/pdf/advices/advice_fr_002.pdf. 
51 For users who have chosen the firm ISABEL as certification authority, a list of public keys called list X500 can be
consulted on the internet site of that firm by using a proprietary application.
52 We take the example here of a terminal, though this is equally applicable to a secure internet site.
53 Using what is called a one-way function, which is an irreversible scrambling mechanism designed to transform a
message into a sequence of symbols but without being able to reverse the process.
53 This entire procedure is exactly transposable to the authentication mechanism, except that in the latter case,
instead of encrypting a message that makes sense, the message to be encrypted makes no sense whatsoever (it is
a number that is chosen at random by the card), so that the sole purpose of entering one’s PIN code and the
unfolding of the entire process is to authenticate the holder.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ELECTRONIC IDENTITY CARD IN BELGIAN LAW BY THE ACT OF 25 MARCH 2003
27www.deaeslr.org DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW
28 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW www.deaeslr.org
If the use of RSA technology tends to provide a
technical certainty that the signature is correct,
there still however remains the question who has
signed. Was it indeed the person holding the
public key that was used? It is in this respect that
confidence in the PKI infrastructure acquires its full
significance. To illustrate this, let us take the
following example:
When Mr Y tries to get in touch with Mr Z for
important information, the stages are structured in
a similar way to our purposes. If Mr Y only has the
name and address of Mr Z, how will Mr Y proceed
to get in touch with him? By consulting the
telephone directory, which will provide Mr Y with
a telephone number. He will then dial that number
and he will hear a voice. The question is: how can
he be sure that this voice is indeed that of Mr Z?
In our society, we assume that this will be the case,
since a telephone directory generally offers a
proper guarantee of reliability since it has been
published by a trustworthy authority.55
When we replace the telephone number
obtained from the telephone directory with the
public key, the voice with the secret key, and the
directory with the certificate56 supplied by the CSP,
it becomes clear that trust in the origin and
reliability of the public key is essential.
What remains is to ascertain the contents of this
certificate. Roughly speaking, the certificate
contained in the card holds the information that a
public key belongs to Mr Z. It also contains the
signature of the certification authority, which has
been placed there by the person obtaining the
card. Nevertheless, how do we ascertain that this
certificate is trustworthy? To this end, the terminal
will use the public key of the CSP, which it trusts
since it had been placed in the terminal right from
the start. It will then apply the same structure of
the RSA mechanism as that described above, but
this time with the keys of the authority.
In accordance with the principle of non-
repudiation of a signature, the holder who signed
by means of his private key contained on his
identity card will not be able to contest his
signature, since he is presumed to be the only
person to “know” it and able to use it.57
At present, the firm Certipost has been chosen
in this connection as accredited CSP.58 Besides its
role as producer of certificates, its job will also be
to verify that the public key belongs to the holder.
To this end, it will issue a qualified electronic
certificate, which will make it possible to link the
identity of the bearer of the electronic identity card
to his public key.
This being the case, even if from a technological
viewpoint, the digital signature based on the RSA
and PKI technologies is the only one that can be
equated with a handwritten signature, the fact
remains that a necessary precondition must always
be required in order to be sure of the authenticity
of the signature, namely that the person entering
the PIN code during the signature stage is indeed
the bearer of the card. There is always a risk, in the
absence of verification of the bearer’s identity, that
a dishonest third party who has obtained
knowledge of the secret code of the bearer may
use the card for fraudulent purposes. Nevertheless,
at the moment, entry of the PIN code is, in our
opinion, the safest way to initiate the electronic
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55 This is already less the case if this number is obtained from an internet site, which is, by definition, more easy to
falsify than a telephone directory.
56 This certificate contains several references: the name of the accredited certification service provider, the name of the
holder of the certificate, the unique identification of the certificate holder, the period of validity of the certificate, the
serial number of the certificate, the signature of the certification service provider confirming that this information is
correct.
57 Editors note: this is not a legal presumption, it is a technical presumption, as the authors illustrate further on in this article.
58 This accreditation is subject to a twofold obligation: firstly, the CSP must comply with certain qualitative obligations
and must issue qualified certificates, and, secondly, the CSP must use secure signature creation devices.
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signature mechanism. It seems to us that this risk
can only be avoided from the moment that
biometric type signatures are introduced, allowing
identification and authentication of the card bearer
by verifying one or several of his own physical
features (generally by taking fingerprints or
verifying the retina of the eye). It should also be
noted that only half the memory of the electronic
chip of the identity card will be used for the
functions described above, thus leaving room for
other applications.
One such application might be the payment
function and electronic funds transfer function,
even if this solution seems unlikely in the short
term,59 which we will discuss in more detail below,
namely in connection with the consequences of
fraudulent use following loss or theft. However,
other functions may be considered too. Certain
initiatives have already been taken in other
countries to add biometric functions, electronic
driving licence, system of direct payment by Social
Security fund (replacing social security (SIS) card),
amongst other uses.60 
The major risks associated with concentrating,
on one single electronic chip, all personal details
and all the functions offered by cards in general
(banking functions, social security card, badge for
access to buildings, fan card, rail season ticket, etc)
will undoubtedly become manifest in the future.
n Length of storage of electronic
certificates 
The law stipulates that the electronic identity
card is valid for five years. As has already been
mentioned, these cards are provided with
electronic certificates for authentication and
electronic signature. The length of the encryption
keys used is currently fixed at 1024 bits, at least
until 2013. Thus it can happen that, from one
moment to the next, a citizen can no longer use
the certificates contained on the electronic cards,
either because he has died, or because his card
has expired, or because the length of the
encryption key has changed, thus necessitating a
renewal of the certificates. The question that
comes up is how to prove in the future that an
instrument has indeed been signed with an
electronic signature, given that the certificates
contained on the card at the moment when the
question arises may be different from those used
for signing the instrument in question? The
legislation on electronic signatures61 and the Act
governing electronic identity cards62 precisely
answer this question by stipulating that the
certification service providers and the National
Register are obliged to keep a list of certificates
used by each citizen for a period of 30 years. The
parliamentary documents63 show that this choice is
in fact based on Article 2262 of the Civil Code,
which provides for a thirty-year period.
A second unresolved question immediately
springs to mind: what happens if an instrument or
contract signed with an electronic identity card is
contested more than 30 years after the signature
certificates have been filed? Is this limitation to 30
years not likely to create a certain legal uncertainty,
which the legislator should remedy?
Legal consequences of loss or
theft of the card: notification
and misuse
n Notification of loss or theft of
an electronic identity card
Unlike the Act of 17 July 2002 on electronic
funds transfer,64 which only provides for a general
obligation for the issuers of bank cards to supply
the holder with “the appropriate means to enable
him at any time to notify loss or theft of his or her
bank card”, without any further specification, the
Act of 25 March 2003 distinguishes notifications
made “during or after office hours”.65 During office
hours, notifications must be made “to the
municipal authority”, which will issue a certificate
of loss, theft or destruction of the electronic
identity card. The municipal authority will in turn
instruct the accredited CSP, through the National
Register, to immediately suspend or withdraw the
59 In our opinion, this public/private synergy will not be realized in the short or medium term, since every bank uses
and knows its own security technique. Furthermore, how should the issue of branding of the cards be addressed?
Will we find ourselves with an electronic identity card that is sponsored by a banking institution? Moreover, the
target group of the electronic identity card and that of the bank card do not correspond. In any case, what interest do
credit institutions have in investing in expensive RSA and PKI technologies whereas an electronic signature initiated
by a bank PIN code is contractually equated with a handwritten signature, and therefore acquires the same legal
value as the secure signature of an electronic identity card, without however complying with the legal stipulation
which is solely applicable in an open network?
60 Certipost, “White Paper. EID usage in Belgium”, p. 6, available in electronic format at www.certipost.be/eID.
61 Annex II, subparagraph i of the Act of 9 July 2001 establishing certain rules governing the legal framework for
electronic signatures and certification services.
62 Article 3, Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
63 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 10.
64 Act of 17 July 2002 governing transactions carried out using electronic funds transfer instruments, Moniteur Belge, 17
August 2002, p. 35337.
65 Article 16 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
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electronic function of the card.
The term ‘electronic function’ is ambiguous to
say the least. According to the preamble, it
corresponds to “the identity and/or signature
certificates contained on the card”.66 After office
hours, a helpdesk has to be set up at the National
Register. This helpdesk will receive all notifications
of loss or theft of the electronic identity card and
will, where appropriate, suspend or withdraw the
‘electronic function’ of the card. The bearer must
subsequently ask the municipal authority for a
certificate of loss or theft. 
If the card is retrieved within seven days
following the notification, the municipal authority
will instruct the accredited CSP to reactivate the
electronic function. If the card is not retrieved
within that time, the bearer must apply to the
municipal authority for a new card. The municipal
authority will cancel the lost, stolen or destroyed
electronic identity card and ask the CSP to
withdraw the ‘electronic function’ of that card,
and will then launch the procedure for the
production of a new card.67
According to the preliminary documents,68 it has
been maintained that this helpdesk is not
comparable with “Card Stop” (helpdesk shared by
all banks in case of loss or theft of a bank card)
and that it is advisable that the municipal authority
should remain the general point of contact in case
of loss, theft or destruction of the electronic
identity card. The helpdesk would have to be used
only sparingly. From this point of view, “a very
elaborate helpdesk would be difficult to run and
hard to justify financially”.69
One may wonder about the practicality of this
distinction as regards the moment when a loss or
theft is notified. Would it not be likely to cause
pointless confusion in the minds of the citizens? It
should be noted that at present Card Stop already
receives thousands of notifications of loss or theft
of identity cards per year, without however being
able to take action since this call centre is not
designed for this! In those circumstances, it might
be a good idea to consider setting up a permanent
helpdesk, all the more so since the new identity
card will be able to be used as a tool for
authentication or signature, and thus liable to be
used for fraudulent purposes. The texts that were
subsequently adopted eventually brushed aside the
financial misgivings that were raised during the
debates and ultimately insisted on the permanence
of the service to be set up.
The Act therefore now provides that the
helpdesk must be “permanently operational” 70
without making any distinction between working
hours and non-working hours. The implementing
Royal Decree specifies in this connection that the
helpdesk should be able to be reached “seven days
a week, twenty-four hours a day”, after the
example of Card Stop, by the bearer as well as by
the municipal authorities, the police, the
manufacturer, the initializer and the personalizer of
the card.71 It seems, however, that unfortunately
the opposite message has been given to the
municipal staff. In a document addressed to the
municipalities entitled “General instructions
concerning the electronic identity card”, we read:
“In other words, the helpdesk will, on the direct
request of a citizen, only take a notification of loss,
theft or destruction of an electronic identity card if
no such notification can be made to the municipal
authority of the principal residence or the nearest
police station (after working hours, public holidays,
weekends, or other instances where the
appropriate services cannot be reached)”.72
n Liability in case of fraudulent
use 
As was mentioned above, it is up to the bearer
of the identity card to notify loss or theft.
Following this notification, the electronic function
of the card will either be suspended or withdrawn.
What is the liability of a bearer who fails to notify
such loss or theft, and whose card is then used for
fraudulent purposes?
In this respect, it should be pointed out that in
the area of “electronic funds transfer instruments”
the legislator introduced a special liability
arrangement,73 under which the holder of this
instrument (generally a bank card) is, in principle
(i.e. apart from cases of fraud or serious
negligence), liable up to an upper limit of one
hundred and fifty euros until such time as he has
notified the loss or theft of his card. The issuer of
the card (generally the bank) is liable for all sums
above that limit. After being notified, the issuer of
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66 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p.32.
67 Article 6§2 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, o.c.
68 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p.32.
69 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 32.
70 Article 16 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
71 Article 7 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, o.c. The telephone number of this government
helpdesk is +32(2)518.21.16 (French) or 518.21.17 (Dutch).
72 See http://www.rijksregister.fgov.be/rrn_fr/cccie/circulaire/9mai/INSTRUCTIONS GENERALES CID MAI
2003.pdf.
73 Article 8§2 of the Act of 17 July 2002, o.c.














which is liable to
cause considerable
financial prejudice
the electronic funds transfer instrument will be
liable for all financial consequences connected
with the fraudulent use of this instrument.
So far, no such liability arrangement has been
put in place by the legislator with respect to the
electronic identity card. All fraudulent use will
therefore be governed by common law. The
utmost caution is therefore recommended, since
the electronic identity card will in principle
comprise the new electronic authentication and
signature functions, fraudulent use of which is
liable to cause considerable financial prejudice. An
advanced electronic signature produced in the
context of a transaction using a lost or stolen card
will be legally equated with a handwritten
signature produced by its bearer, with all the
implications that this entails.
Assuming that, in the future, it will also be
possible to activate a payment function on the
identity card, we believe this will fall directly within
the scope of the Act of 17 July 2002 on electronic
funds transfers, which applies to “any instrument
allowing the performance, wholly or partly by
electronic means, of one or several of the
following transactions: funds transfers, withdrawal
and depositing of cash, remote access to a bank
account, charging and discharging of a
rechargeable instrument”.74
Less straightforward, however, is the task of
determining the person who has to be considered
as the issuer (who will in principle be liable for the
financial consequences of any fraudulent use of
the said funds transfer function, following
notification). According to the Act of 17 July 2002,
an issuer is considered to be “any person who, as
part of his business activity, puts an electronic funds
transfer instrument at the disposal of another
person in accordance with a contract concluded
with that person”.75 Who would be concerned with
respect to electronic identity cards? Should the
liability of the State be involved or only that of the
banks? We cannot avoid the conclusion that, at the
current stage of technology, there is no clear legal
solution that can be offered yet.
We can, however, try to extrapolate on the basis
of certain funds transfer applications that are
already operational in the field of m-commerce (or
mobile commerce, generally using techniques
provided by a mobile telephone). For example, one
facility that already exists consists in recharging the
prepaid card of a mobile telephone by means of
the mobile telephone itself or, as is already the
case in Finland, making payments directly with a
mobile telephone. In the latter case, it would seem
that the banks should at first sight be regarded as
the issuers of the transfer instrument (rather than
the mobile telephone operators), insofar as the
legal rules governing the use of the payment
function in m-commerce are contractually defined
in the general banking conditions, which the
cardholder has agreed to observe.
In this hypothesis, given a closed network, we
may ask ourselves what benefit the banks would
derive from choosing the digital signature of the
identity card as a means of signature or
authentication while the applicable liability
arrangement is identical to that of a banking card.
Data appearing on the card:
legal implications 
n Obligatory data and absence of
address legible with the naked eye 
Besides the signature of the bearer, the
electronic identity card must bear the signature of
the municipal official issuing the card, or, where
appropriate, the signature of the post office clerk
charged with issuing it. The signature of this
official confirms that the identity of the bearer was
verified when he presented himself at the town
hall. In addition, there are a number of data that
must appear on the card. Some of this information
can both be read with the naked eye and be
consulted by means of an electronic device,
whereas other data can only be consulted
electronically.
n Data that are visible to the naked eye
and electronically readable 
Article 14 of the Act of 25 March 2003 specifies
which information is visible to the naked eye as
well as electronically readable:76 name, first two
forenames, first letter of the third forename,
nationality, place and date of birth, sex, place of
issue of the card, starting date and expiry date of
the card, name and number of the card,
photograph of the bearer and his identification
number in the National Register.77
74 Article 2,1° of the Act of 17 July 2002 governing transactions carried out using electronic funds transfer
instruments, o.c.
75 Article 2,3° of the Act of 17 July 2002 governing transactions carried out using electronic funds transfer
instruments, Article 2, o.c
76 Other information may also appear on the card: certification of prolonged minority status (Article 487f, par. 4 of
the Civil Code), indication of ‘white stick’ or ‘yellow stick’ for the blind or partially sighted (Royal Decrees of 25
August 1954 and 9 March 1992).
77 As regards the identification number in the National Register, we should mention that while with the
conventional identity card the citizen could choose whether or not this number should appear on the card, this
option has now been withdrawn for no specific reason.
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n Information that is electronically
readable only
There are various kinds of data that are
electronically readable only through the use of an
electronic reading device that can read the
electronic chip on the card. The data concerned
are first of all those that are necessary for the
authentication of the card as well as for the
protection of the electronic data and the use of
qualified certificates. 
Three other categories of data may also appear
on the card in electronic form insofar as the bearer
has activated them,78 such as the electronic keys
and identity and signature certificates, as well as
the identity of the accredited CSP.  Finally, the card
will also bear various data required by law, as well
as the address of the bearer’s principal residence.
n Absence of the principal residence
from the data that are visible to the
naked eye 
Unlike with the paper identity card, the bearer’s
address no longer appears on the electronic
identity card in a format visible to the naked eye. It
will now only be available electronically. According
to the parliamentary documents,79 this decision
was motivated by various arguments:
n First, the legislator wanted to leave out a 
data element which tends to fluctuate too 
much. It considered in this respect that 10 
per cent of the population changes address 
every year, and that it therefore has become 
too difficult to ascertain the accuracy of the 
address appearing on the card.
n Furthermore, it wanted to avoid the 
procedure of changing the electronic identity 
card in case of change of address, a 
constraining procedure which would have 
necessitated a too frequent renewal of the 
card. The Council of Europe is in full 
agreement with this, since it considers that 
the address should not be regarded an 
identity element of a person. 80
n Finally, if the card is lost or stolen, it is 
preferable, for security reasons, that the 
address should not be directly readable, so as
to make the link between a card and the 
contents of a stolen handbag more difficult 
to establish (for example house or car keys). 
This is one of the reasons why the Federal 
Department of the Interior has addressed a 
circular81 to the pilot municipalities, 
specifying the modalities whereby a citizen 
can prove his address in accordance with 
Article 3 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 
2003.82
Although the reasons given above do indeed
justify the omission of the address from the data
that are legible with the naked eye, it seems
nevertheless that the fact that the address is not
directly readable in turn creates new legal
problems that need to be resolved. Thus, in the
area of banking, a series of legal rules require
credit institutions to know the address of their
customers in accordance with the compliance
principle know your customer. This is particularly
the case with the Act of 11 January 1993 on
combating money laundering, which requires the
banks to verify the address of their customers by
means of probative documents of which they must
make a copy.83 In this connection, the Banking,
Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) requires
credit institutions, investment companies,
investment consulting firms and exchange offices
to identify the customer’s address by making a
photocopy of the identity card and the address
that appears on it.84
How is this requirement to be satisfied if the
address no longer appears on the card? The
solution that is currently being considered, is to
equip those financial institutions with the
necessary technical infrastructure to consult the
data contained on the electronic chip. It would
then suffice to print out the information appearing
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78 We may ask ourselves how those elements are to be activated once the electronic identity card has been issued. In
our opinion, the card would have to be renewed.
79 Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 25.
80 Resolution (77) 26 of the Council of Europe on the establishment and harmonization of national identity cards,
adopted on 28 September 1977. Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p.
26.
81 Circular available in electronic format at
http://www.rijksregister.fgov.be/rrn_fr/cccie/circulaire/mentionadresse/OB-VermAdres281103-FR-v121203.pdf.
82 A document called “Proof of Address” will be issued by the municipal authority together with the card. This
document may be used as proof of principal residence in pursuance of Article 3 of the Royal Decree of 25 March
2003.
83 Article 4 of the Act of 11 January 1993 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money
laundering, Moniteur Belge, 9 February 1993, p.2828.
84 Circular D1/WB 99/1, Circular D4/EB/2000/2, Circular D1/WB 99/1, and to a lesser extent Circular PPB 2003/5 of
the Banking and Finance Commission to credit institutions, investment companies, investment consulting firms and
exchange offices concerning the identification of customers bearing electronic identity cards.
on the computer screen in order to comply with
the legal obligation to make a photocopy.
In a circular of 22 December 2003,85 the BFIC
points out that the financial institutions are obliged
to make sure that they furnish themselves
adequately and as soon as possible with
appropriate appliances to read and record the
necessary data that are stored on the
microprocessor with which the new electronic
identity cards are fitted. This circular stipulates that
a copy must be made of the identification details
that are electronically signed by the National
Register and thus verify the validity of this
signature. This verification takes place by
ascertaining the validity of the certificate of the
National Register that is introduced along with the
last modification of the data on the chip. This
certificate will be useful for tracing the origin of
the information obtained during printing.
Furthermore, the certificate of the National
Register will be altered in case of an attempt to
modify the information contained on the chip by
any person other than an employee of the
National Register who has been duly authorized to
do so. In this way, a degree of certainty can be
had as to the validity of those data. Finally, in order
to guarantee the integrity of the recorded data,
the circular provides that the identification details
and their electronic signature by the National
Register should be kept together so as to allow
subsequent verification of the signature.86
In so doing, the BFIC implicitly admitted the
absence of a visible address on the electronic
identity card, while urging the credit institutions to
furnish themselves with the necessary
infrastructure. 
It should also be pointed out that the anti-
laundering legislation is not the only legislation
requiring verification of the address of the bearer
of an electronic identity card. Other law texts also
provide for this, such as in the area of inheritance87
or consumer credit88 law, where in both cases
verification of the identity of the customer is
required. In the area of consumer credit, it is also
provided that certain data must be recorded in the
Central Consumer Credit Register, such as the
domicile of the borrower or, if this is non-existent
or unknown, his residence, identified by the name
of the street, number of the building, the letterbox
number where appropriate, the name of the town
and the postcode. According to this law, the name
and address of the lender must be recorded as
well.89 
This absence of the bearer’s address in visible
form from the electronic identity card will
therefore require the banks and any other body
that is legally obliged to verify this information90 to
furnish themselves with the necessary technology
to electronically read the card, whether directly by
means of a compatible card reader or by asking
for an exception granting a limited access to the
National Register.
The Act of 25 March 2003 provides in this
connection that the appliances and applications
that must allow consultation of the data that are
electronically stored on the electronic identity card
must satisfy certain technical and functional
standards established by the King. The conditions
of sale, rental and transmission of those appliances
will also be regulated by the King.91 Those
terminals must also be compatible with the
specifications established by the firm ZETES92 and
must satisfy the conditions laid down in the
specifications for the manufacture, personalization,
initialization and distribution of the digital identity
cards and for the provision of certification
services.93 There are even plans to create a special
label for the electronic identity card, with which
the terminals will be provided that are designed to
read them, and must satisfy certain predefined
technical and security conditions.
n Right of access and rectification
of the electronically recorded data 
In accordance with the Act of 8 December 1992
on the protection of privacy with regard to the
processing of personal data,94 which outlines a set
of general rules governing the right of access and
rectification of files containing automated data
(including the National Register), the bearer of an
85 Circular PPB 2003/5.
86 BIENFAIT, B., “La carte d’identité électronique. La circulaire PPB 2003/5 du 22 décembre 2003 de la Commission
Bancaire et Financière” in “La carte d’identité électronique dans la pratique financière”, FEBELFIN Information
Meeting, 10 March 2004. 
87 Article 218 of the Civil Code.
88 Article 17 of the Act of 24 March 2003 amending the Act of 12 June 1991 on consumer credit, Moniteur Belge, 2
May 2003, p. 23749.
89 Article 2 of the Royal Decree of 7 July 2002 regulating the Central Consumer Credit Register, Moniteur Belge, 19
July 2002, p. 32542.
90 For example the Belgian National Bank, investment consulting firms, insurance companies.
91 Article 18 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
92  Specifications available in electronic format at http://www.rijksregister.fgov.be
93  Specifications available in electronic format at http://www.rijksregister.fgov.be/bev_fr/bev_f_dispatcher.htm
94 Act on the protection of privacy with regard to the processing of personal data, Moniteur Belge, 18 March 1993, p.
5801.
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electronic identity card is granted directly, or via a computer that is placed at his disposal at a municipal
institution, a right of access to the electronic data recorded on his card, as well as the right to rectify those
data if they turn out to be incomplete, inaccurate or incorrect.95 It is also perfectly possible for the bearer to
carry out this verification at home by means of his computer and an internet connection.96
The bearer will even be able to know the identity of all the authorities, organizations and persons who
over the past six months have consulted or updated his details in the population register or in the National
Register of natural persons, with the exception of the administrative and judicial authorities charged with
investigating and combating crime. The modalities of those rights of access and rectification that are granted
to the bearer will be established by the King.
n Identity Cards Register97
The Identity Cards Register, set up by law within the National Register of natural persons, is an essential tool
to monitor the lifecycle of electronic identity cards. This register makes it possible to centralize all information
about the identity cards and to follow each particular card during its production process. It contains information
about the bearer of the card98 as well as about the card itself.99 The conditions by which a person may obtain
access to this file will be established by Royal Decree.
The Identity Cards Register will be updated regularly with the necessary information which the municipal
authorities, the initializer and the accredited CSP will to this end send to the Federal Department of the Interior.
Delivery procedure
n Delivery procedure in the strict sense100
The delivery procedure for the electronic identity card is fairly complex and can be subdivided into various
main stages, as shown in the diagram below:
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95  Article 6§3 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
96  This right of access may be exercised via https://mondossier.rrn.fgov.be.
97  Article 15 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
98  For the bearer, the identification number in the National Register, the language of the electronic identity card and the
serial number of the card are mentioned.
99  For the card, the date of application, expiry and destruction of the card are specified, as well as the date of issue of
the basic document, the date of delivery and the municipality charged with this delivery. Also available are the serial
number of the card, information showing that the card is valid or expired, the type of identity card, where
appropriate, the availability of the electronic signature function and the dates of the latest general update and the
latest update of the principal residence.
100  Article 3§4 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, Moniteur Belge, 28 March 2003, p.15929.
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n First stage: physical contact between
the bearer and the registrar 
The Federal Department of the Interior first sends
a notification (1) to each municipality through the
personalizer (2). The municipal authority is instructed
to transmit this notification to the citizen referred to
therein. The citizen must present himself with a sum
of money and a recent photograph to the registrar
of his municipality in order to complete the “basic
document” (3). On this document all the data
needed to produce the electronic identity card are
brought together.101 When he arrives at the town
hall, the citizen must first identify himself to the
registrar. This identification will be corroborated by
the current identity card. The registrar and the bearer
then jointly sign the basic document containing all
the appropriate information of the electronic identity
card. This document is then sent to the Registration
Centre of the National Register (4) where the data
will be recorded in the Identity Cards Register and
then retransmitted to the card personalizer (5).
n Second stage: production and
personalization of the plastic card
In Belgium, the role of manufacturer and
initializer of the electronic identity card has been
entrusted to Zetes following a procurement
contract procedure. As manufacturer, Zetes
attends to the production of the plastic card and
the microprocessor. As personalizer, its job is to
print on the card the personal details contained in
the basic document (i.e. the information intended
for the card bearer as well as the data on the card
that are visible to the naked eye). It also places the
bearer’s photograph on the electronic identity card.
Finally, it also takes care of the appropriate security
measures in order, for example, to prevent all
possible fraud. Once the card has been
personalized, Zetes transfers it to the initializer (6).
n Third stage: initialization of the card 
Request for initialization
The initializer, which is again the firm Zetes, first
generates a pair of basic technical keys which have
but a limited usefulness during the initialization
process, and subsequently stores the unique card
number (identifying the card) on the card along
with the identity details of the requester as
required by the Act of 25 March 2003.102 Next, it
generates two pairs of keys on the card, namely
the identification key, which allows the bearer to
identify himself by means of a PIN code, and the
signature key, which enables him to produce his
digital signature by means of the PIN code.
It is for the bearer to decide whether or not he
wishes to initialize’ his electronic identity card (that
is to say, whether or not he wishes to use his
identity and signature certificates). If he does not
wish to do so, the data relating to the identity and
signature keys, the identity and signature
certificates and the CSP held by the certification
authority remain in “inactive” status and the
bearer does not receive a PIN code. If on the other
hand the bearer wishes to make use of the
authentication or digital signature functions, the
initalizer103 will at the same time transmit, through
the National Register, the requests for qualified
certificates to the accredited CSP (also called
certification authority), namely the firm Certipost
(7) (8).104
Default activation of the authentication and
electronic signature functions 
Since the law remains fairly vague about the
way in which those authentication and electronic
signature functions are assigned, the government
services have chosen the “opt-out” technique,
according to which those functions will be
automatically available and activated on the
bearer’s card unless the latter expressly refuses. To
do so, the government services based themselves
on the new Article 6§2 in fine of the Act, which
stipulates that the card bearer may, if he so wishes,
waive the activation of the identity and signature
keys and certificates. This choice goes against the
European practice, which prefers the opt-in
technique to the opt-out technique.105 Moreover,
does it really make sense to automatically activate
those functions on the electronic identity card
101 I.e. card number, National Register number, issuing municipality, type of card, language of the card, date of
delivery, expiry date, date of birth, nationality, address, name, forename, signature of the bearer, signature of the
official delivering the card, photograph of the bearer.
102 I.e. National Register number, principal residence, qualified certificates, name of the accredited certification
service provider, necessary information for the authentication of the card and the protection of the electronic
data.
103 In this specific context, the initializer will play the part of registration authority, since it is to the initializer that
the bearer must apply for a certificate and it is the initializer who will verify the bearer’s identity. After this
verification, the initializer transmits this request to the personalizer, who in turn plays the part of certification
authority. The personalizer produces the certificate and links it to a pair of keys.
104 This is currently Certipost, a joint division of Belgacom and the Post Office, while the creation sensu stricto of the
certificates is taken care of by Ubizen.
105 Thus, for example, on the subject of advertising on the internet, Article 14 of the Act of 11 March 2003 on certain
legal aspects of information society services stipulates that the use of electronic mail for advertising purposes is
prohibited without the prior, free, specific and informed consent of the addressee of the messages.
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whereas certain bearers have no use for them
whatsoever on account of their legal incapacity or
their age? Will this not give an extra incentive to
fraud? Such an opt-out technique should
unquestionably be accompanied by strict and
formal safeguards so that the citizen is effectively
informed about this option that is offered by the
law to waive the activation of those functions.
Security questions linked to the
authentication and electronic signature PIN
codes 
The few lines that follow are concerned more
with security than with legal considerations. It
appears that the secret codes used to initiate the
authentication and electronic signature functions
can be the same. Does this not devalue the
signature PIN code which up to now has been
used as a concrete manifestation of a bankcard
holder’s undertaking to carry out an electronic
funds transfer? Should we not more fully
differentiate the authentication and signature
functions in order to make citizens aware of the
importance attached to entering the signature PIN
code? Moreover, given that those two PIN codes
are made up of four figures, is there not a major
risk that the citizen, through negligence or
through ignorance of the risks, will use the same
PIN code for the two functions? There is a
considerable likelihood that a citizen will eventually
use the same code for his debit card, credit card,
mobile phone and electronic identity card. In this
respect, we would strongly recommend that the
government and the FEDICT take appropriate
action in order to minimize such risks, for example
by prescribing that the authentication PIN code
consists of four figures while the signature PIN
code numbers five or more figures.
Creation of electronic certificates
The certificates generated by the accredited CSP
are transmitted to the National Register (9) which,
in its role as original and authentic source, verifies
the information on the first certificate as well as
the digital signature on the second certificate
before transferring them to the initializer (10) who
then stores the PIN, PUK1 (Personal Unblocked Key
enabling the bearer to activate his card) and PUK2
(enabling the authorized agent to activate the
card) codes on the card. These codes are to be
distinguished from the signature and identification
keys that are contained in electronic form on the
electronic identity card. The finished electronic
identity card is then sent to the municipality (11) in
a secure case. The PIN and PUK1 codes are
transmitted to the card bearer (11) by the
initializer, while the PUK2 code is sent to the
municipality by the National Register.
n Fourth stage: activation of the card
The municipal authority106 invites the citizen
(12), insofar as the latter has received his personal
codes by post, to come and collect his electronic
identity card. On the spot (13) it first needs to be
verified whether the first stages have been
completed correctly and whether the different
certificates and secret codes work properly. At that
moment, the bearer will decide whether to use his
electronic identity card simply as an identity
document or as an authentication document
containing an electronic signature. If the bearer
does not use the electronic signature, he only
needs to enter his PUK1 code to activate the card.
If he wants to be able to use the authentication
and electronic signature functions, he will activate
the card jointly with the competent official by
entering the PUK1 and PUK2 codes respectively.
He must then produce a test signature by means
of his PIN code in order to test the qualified
certificate. Finally, he must perform a test
identification on a website of the authority that is
specially intended for that purpose by again using
his PIN code. Only once these final stages have
been successfully completed will the electronic
identity card be effectively activated and handed
over to the bearer.107 The activation of the card will
naturally be registered at the Central Identity Cards
Register.108
The entire process of manufacture and delivery
of the electronic identity card as well as of the
qualified certificates of identity and electronic
signature will be overseen by a sectorial committee
of the National Register that has been specially set
up by law.109
n Centralizing role of the National
Register 
The National Register acts as an intermediary
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106 It should be pointed out that the Programme Act of 5 August 2003 (Programme Act of 5 August 2003, Article 37,
Moniteur Belge, 7 August 2003, p 40498) provides that the municipal authority can delegate the delivery of the
electronic identity cards to the Post Office in its capacity as a public corporation. In that case, the signature of the
Post Office employee delivering the card must also appear on the card.
107 Article 9 of the Act of 25 March 2003 and its Preamble, Parliamentary documents, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 16.
108 This activation procedure takes about 15 minutes. 
109 Article 13 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
between the different organizations in this delivery
procedure. It takes care of the coordination
between the request to the municipality for a card
by the bearer and the transfer of this request to
the manufacturer, the personalizer and the
initializer of the card. The National Register is
informed of the different stages in the
manufacturing process of the card. It also requests
the authentication and electronic signature
certificates from the CSP. It verifies whether the
assigned set of keys is indeed unique and prepares
the details for requesting a certificate for the
verified set of keys. It then assigns the number of
the certificate and asks an accredited CSP to
deliver a certificate. 
n 3) Conditions of delivery110
An electronic identity card can only be issued to
Belgians and to foreigners who are admitted or
authorized to stay in Belgium. The references on
the back of the card will vary according to the
status of the card bearer. Next to the word
“Belgium” there must respectively appear the
words “identity card” for Belgians, “aliens
residence card” for nationals of the European
Union or of the European Economic Area, and
“aliens identity card” in all other cases.
Under the prerogatives that have been granted
to him by law,111 the King has decided that, as is
already the case with the present identity cards,
the card (or the certificate of theft, loss or
destruction of the card which is only valid for a
renewable period of maximum one year) will be
distributed by the municipal authority to every
Belgian citizen from the age of 12. Carrying the
card will become compulsory from the age of
15.112
The maximum period of validity of the card is
reduced to five years (instead of 10 years as is
currently the case for every citizen from the age of
22). The reason set out in the Preamble is twofold:
first to avoid that the photograph on the card
loses its true likeness and second to allow the
security technology contained in the electronic
identity card to be fairly regularly adapted in order
to keep up with the incessantly accelerating
development of computer fraud techniques.113
There are several cases where the bearer must
return his electronic identity card to the municipal
authority for renewal: expiry of the legal period of
validity, if the bearer wants a card in a language
other than that in which his card was made, if the
photograph is no longer a true likeness, if the card
is damaged, or if the bearer changes name,
forename or sex. If the bearer dies or loses his
Belgian nationality, the card will naturally not be
renewed.114
Use of the identity card and
outlook for the future 
Although, at the time of writing, the
applications available for the use of the electronic
identity card are still fairly limited, it is certain that
both the public sector and the private sector will
make use of this new practical opportunity to carry
out more dematerialized and secure transactions
with the citizens. The applications currently
available include on-line consultation of the
National Register over the internet site ‘My file’,115
validation of electronic registered mail transmitted
by Certipost, access to the secure internet site of
Keytradebank, on-line filing of tax returns via Tax
On Web, access to waste sorting parks, request for
a license plate, and requests for parking passes.
In the future, the card may also be used to
consult the progress in the processing of a
planning application, take part in a poll, book
seats at a cultural centre, make use of the ISABEL
services, as a library card, allow lawyers to transmit
their pleadings to the courts and tribunals
electronically: in short, the applications are as
diverse as they are boundless.
Conclusion
The introduction of the new electronic identity
card demonstrates the wish, both at the national
and the European level, to facilitate access and
communication between citizens and government,
while at the same time simplifying certain
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. The recent
emergence of numerous initiatives aimed at
stimulating the use of the electronic identity card
seems to confirm that this objective can eventually
become reality. In addition, the new
“authentication” and “electronic signature”
functions available on the card provide new
standardized techniques allowing each individual
to gain access to legal tools which as yet are not
all that widespread.
The additional benefits offered by the electronic
identity card will not however be limited to the
administrative sector alone. On the contrary, the
110Article 14 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
111Article 6§7 of the Act of 25 March 2003, o.c.
112Articles 1 and 2 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, o.c.
113Parliamentary documents, House of Representatives, Session 2002-2003, 2226/001, p. 30.
114Article 5 of the Royal Decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, o.c.
115 See footnote no. 89.
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card is capable of being used on a daily basis in
private and business relations. Examples include
cards and codes giving access to a series of
functions such as e-banking or access to the
internet. It may even become a suitable instrument
for introducing a certain degree of uniformity in
this area.  However, numerous legal and technical
questions are bound to come up in the meantime.
We have, for example, looked into the problem of
the bearer’s address, which no longer appears on
the card in a visible form, as well as the issue of
the helpdesk and the question of liability in case of
loss or theft of the card.
Other questions may arise in the future too,
however, such as that of branding (will we see
electronic identity cards sponsored by a financial
institution?), or the involvement of third parties in
the validity of the authentication and signature
certificates (management of the CRL).
The Act of 25 March 2003 is a first major step
towards e-government. There is no doubt,
however, that there still remains a long way to
go.116 It should be noted, however, that the
various parties involved in the production,
management and use of the electronic identity
card are in constant touch with each other in order
to find a pragmatic and reliable solution for the
citizen with a view to strictly minimizing the legal
risks attached to the use of the electronic identity
card in the future. n
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116  For more general information on the electronic identity card, we refer the reader to the following internet sites:
www.eid.belgium.be and www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~decockd/belpic/.
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